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ABSTRACT: We examine the economic and political determinants of decisions taken by local 
governments regarding the amount of new land to be assigned for development. The analysis 
draws on a massive database, which includes more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities during the 
1999-2003 term-of-office. The increase in developable land in this period is explained using a 
wide set of variables that capture the specific traits of each municipality in 1999. The variables 
were selected following a review of recommendations made in the literature on urban growth 
controls and by taking into account other factors that might be considered specific to Spain. Our 
results show that urban expansion is influenced by a variety of factors. Thus, the communities 
found to be expanding most: (i) are rich, (ii) have more new housing purchasers, (iii) are in a 
weak financial position, (iv) are controlled by parties to the right of the political spectrum, (v) 
have a low electoral turnout and local government bodies that do not face serious electoral 
competition, and (vi) have more land but a lower proportion of environmentally valuable land. 
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RESUMEN: En este trabajo se examinan los determinantes políticos y económicos de las 
decisiones de los gobiernos locales referentes a la cantidad de nuevo suelo urbanizable que se 
permite desarrollar. El análisis se realiza con una extensa base de datos que incluye más de 
2.000 municipios españoles en el período 1999-2003. El incremento de suelo urbanizable en 
este período se explica con un conjunto de variables que capturan características específicas del 
cada municipio en el año 1999. Las variables son seleccionadas siguiendo las recomendaciones 
de la literatura de control de crecimiento urbano y teniendo en cuenta, además, otros factores 
que puedan ser considerados específicos de España. Los resultados indican que la expansión 
urbanística está influenciada por una amplia variedad de factores. Esto es, los municipios que 
han experimentado una expansión urbanística mayor: (i) son ricos, (ii) tienen más compradores 
de vivienda nueva, (iii) están en una posición financiera débil, (iv) están controlados por 
partidos a la derecha del espectro electoral, (v) tienen una baja participación electoral y el 
gobierno local no se enfrenta a una competencia electoral seria y (vi) tienen más suelo pero una 
menor proporción de suelo valorado en términos medioambientales.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades Spain has witnessed a striking increase in the proportion of its 
developed land. According to data provided by the aerial photographs of the Corine Land Cover 
project (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006), between 1987 and 2000, the artificial land area grew by 
29.5%, roughly one third of its overall historical record. This growth, however, is unevenly 
distributed across the country, being especially intense in urban areas (e.g., Madrid, which grew 
by 50% during this period) and tourist zones along the Mediterranean coast (e.g., Murcia, 
Valencia and the Balearic Islands grew by 60, 50 and 40%, respectively). Most of this 
development took the form of low density urban growth (up by 30% during the period) and 
scattered growth (up by 26%), while the area undergoing compact development increased by a 
meager 4.1%1.  
 
Many of the journalists, academics and politicians that have addressed this issue in Spain 
consider this growth to be excessive (e.g., Martin Mateo, 2007). High urban growth and its 
sprawling nature are blamed for congestion and pollution, for raising the costs of public services 
(Hortas and Solé-Ollé, 2007) and for bringing about the loss of open spaces (García and Riera, 
2003; European Environmental Agency, 2006). At the same time, others, unsur-prisingly, deem 
this growth to be low and claim that, despite the expansion, housing prices rose rapidly from the 
mid 90s, causing a housing affordability problem. Any attempt at resol-ving this controversy, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim, here, is simply to provide an initial 
exploratory analysis of the causes of this process of urban expansion. Clearly the main factor in 
Spain since the mid 90s has been the growth in demand for both residential and holiday homes. 
This rise in demand has many explanations, ranging from high population and income growth, 
to low interest rates and the surge in foreign investment.  
 
But besides these extremely general factors, Spanish commentators have also identified a 
number of other influences that are specific to a region, or even a municipality. The first 
influence noted is the high degree of government fragmentation, which means that the main 
land-use regulatory responsibilities in Spain are in the hands of more than 9,000 municipali-
ties2. These bodies are perceived to care only about local interests, paying scant regard for the 
                                                          
1 The data available for the period 1999-2003, taken from the Dirección General del Catastro (see section 
4 for details) and used in our empirical analysis, suggest that the intensity of the phenomenon in recent 
years is even stronger, with built-up and developable land area growing by 11.4% and 11.7% respectively 
in a four-year period. 
 
2 In fact, these powers are shared with regional governments. The latter can declare certain areas as 
protected zones, and are responsible for passing general regulatory framework laws and for approving 
municipal land-use plans. Municipalities have, however, a large margin of maneuver in urban growth 
decision-making (see, e.g., Riera et al., 1991 for a description of land-use regulation in Spain). 
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protection of regional or national public goods such as the protection of environmentally-
valuable open-spaces3.  A second influence is related to the system used to finance Spanish 
municipalities (Fundación Alternativas, 2007, cap. 4). This relies heavily on revenues related to 
development and includes the property tax, the tax on building activities, the tax on land 
transactions, and the obligation that developers are under to give a portion of newly-developed 
land to the municipality. It has been argued that some short-sighted municipalities choose to 
ignore the future costs of development, preferring to see new development solely as a ‘revenue-
machine’4. A third influence is related to the corruption present in the conversion of land from a 
rural to urban use. Since urban boundaries in Spain are only updated from time to time, a surge 
in demand generates a huge price differential at the fringe, thereby creating the rent needed to 
fuel the bribes paid by developers to local politicians5.  
 
However, while all the municipalities (at least those in one region) operate within the same 
financial and regulatory framework and face similar demand pressures, not all are equally likely 
to expand the amount of developable land. It is precisely these different local responses that this 
paper seeks to understand. Here, we shall not limit ourselves to examining the narrow range of 
local explanations outlined above (i.e., local finances and politics), but rather we intend to 
analyze the theory of growth controls (see section 2) so as to provide additional hypotheses for 
testing. This focus on local explanations is quite novel in the literature. Most empirical analyses 
that seek to explain urban expansion in the US use data aggregated at the metropolitan area level 
and focus, therefore, on inter-regional variation in urban growth patterns (e.g., Carruthers, 2003; 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002; Burchfield et al., 2006). However, as stated above, we are 
interested in understanding the causes underlying the decision to put more developable land on 
the market, which in the case of  Spain is a decision mainly taken by the municipalities. An 
inter-regional analysis would hinder any attempts at monitoring the effect of specific municipal 
traits on urban growth.  
 
However, only a few papers - most of which it must be said are interested in explaining 
differences in land use regulation practices across US local governments than in determining 
                                                          
3The opinion that Spanish municipalities are overgrazing the commons has been made known by several 
journalists. For example, Enrique Gil Calvo described Spanish urbanism as a ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin 1968); see the article “El mal de Marbella” (El País, 24/04/2006). 
 
4 In a recent editorial, a Spanish newspaper described this very situation: “the municipalities, indebted and 
without the necessary flow of income from their own revenues, see in land development their main and 
most tempting source of finance” (El País, 6/10/2006). 
 
5 The 2006 report conducted in Spain by Transparency International states that one of the main corruption 
problems in Spain occurs at the local level and is related to land-use regulation. The report states that “the 
higher levels of corruption are found in local governments” and are mainly caused by thier “ability to 
change the land-use status”.  
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growth outcomes - have recently started to conduct intra-regional analyses (e.g., Bates and 
Santerre, 1994; Brueckner, 1998; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003; Evenson, 2003; and Glaeser and 
Ward, 2006). Thus, our paper resembles these quite closely, as we also focus on land use 
decisions made by local governments. The papers by Evenson (2003) and Evenson and 
Wheaton (2003) are perhaps most similar to ours, since their aim is to explain intra-regional 
differences in the amount of protected land area - the diametrically opposite variable to the one 
which we analyze here i.e. the amount of land assigned for development. The main distinction 
that can be drawn with these two papers, however, is that, instead of analyzing the absolute 
amount of developable land that each municipality has in a given year, we focus on the amount 
of land that each local government added to the stock of developable land during a term-of-
office. By relating the growth in developable land to the initial traits of each municipality we are 
able to attenuate the endogeneity problems which plague cross-sectional analyses and, at the 
same time, we can concentrate on the real decision taken by local governments (i.e., the passing 
of a new land regulation allowing a certain amount of new land to be developed). Our procedure 
will allow us to disentangle these municipal-specific factors from area-wide influences. With 
this purpose in mind, we divide Spain into a number of areas and introduce a fixed effect into 
the equation for each of them, so we are in fact analyzing urban expansion of municipalities 
relative to that of the area where they belong.  
 
In undertaking our analysis we use data concerning the amount of developable land provided by 
the Spanish national property assessment agency (Dirección General del Catastro, Ministry of 
Economics and Finance). We believe that this variable captures more than adequately the 
change in the regulatory status of municipal land and, therefore, it is appropriate for our 
analysis. We focus on the new land assigned for development during 1999-2003, which covers 
one term-of-office for the Spanish municipalities. The explanatory variables are measured for 
the first year in the period, i.e. 1999. The paper is organized as follows. The second section 
provides a basic theoretical framework within which we are then able to develop the various 
hypotheses we seek to test. In the third section, we perform the empirical analysis, present the 
equation, discuss the econometrics, and describe the specific variables used. The results are 
presented in the fourth section. The last section provides the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
The purpose of the paper is to analyze decisions taken by municipalities concerning the amount 
of ‘developable land’, leaving to one side all other regulations included within planning 
documents. This approach has two main advantages; first, in practical terms, this is what in fact 
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we are able to measure for all Spanish municipalities; second, in theoretical terms, a number of 
papers have previously been published that model local decision-making regarding ‘growth 
controls’ and ‘urban growth boundaries’, the terms used to refer to the amount of developable 
land. In this section we review this body of literature so that we might derive several 
theoretically-founded hypotheses related to urban expansion. The impact of ‘urban growth 
controls’ can be analyzed using the standard urban model developed by Alonso (1964), Muth 
(1967), Mills (1972) and Wheaton (1974). The papers by Brueckner (1990 and 1995) and 
Brueckner and Lai (1996) model growth controls using this approach. In this section we will use 
a simplified version of the model (Brueckner, 1999) to derive our testable hypotheses.  
 
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First, we present the basic version of the model, 
which assumes that growth controls are chosen solely to reflect the interests of landowners. 
Second, we present additional results obtained when renters and owners of undeveloped land are 
allowed to play some role in the political process. Third, we discuss the effects of introducing 
open space benefits and of allowing these benefits to spill over community boundaries. 
 
2.1. Basic model: when landowners dominate the political process 
 
The basic version of the model works as follows. We have an area labeled k which has nk 
communities. Each community i is populated by mobile renters who commute to work in the 
central part of the community, where they are able to obtain a wage premium wi while incurring 
time and money costs that increase with distance l from their place of residence to the center, 
and which are given by tkl. We also assume that tk is the same in all communities, which is 
appropriate here as we cannot measure this variable at the municipality level. Renters consume 
land, the amount of which is fixed at one unit per household, and  a private good, denoted ci. 
The utility of each resident also depends on amenities, ai, and on the population size of the 
community, Ni:  ui = ci + ai – βiNi where βi is an externality parameter, reflecting the impact of 
new residents. We also allow this to differ across communities. It is also assumed that the land 
under the jurisdiction of the community (both developed and undeveloped) is owned by 
absentee landowners. The budget constraint of a renter household living at a distance l from the 
city center is ci + r = wi – tkl, where r is the rent per unit of land. Rearranging this equation we 
obtain the bid-rent function r = wi – tkl – ci . This bid-rent function is downward-sloping, 
indicating that rents are higher the closer you move towards the center.  
 
Consider now the growth control decision of a controlling city i assuming that the remaining nk-
1 cities of the urban area are passive. In this case, the equilibrium conditions are:  
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Where li  and lk are the spatial sizes chosen by the controlling city and by the (identical) passive 
cities. The first condition says that the total renter population kN
~  must live in one of the nk 
communities. The second says that utility must be the same in the controlling city as it is in its 
passive counterpart, and the third condition says that boundary rent must be zero in passive 
cities. Solving the system (1)-(3) we can obtain the expressions for ci and ck as a function of li. 
These expressions (which are omitted here for reasons of space) tell us that consumption falls in 
both communities as li is reduced. This is a direct consequence of the higher land rents in both 
communities. The utility of the renter is also affected negatively by a reduction in li. However, 
total land rent in the community increases as li is reduced because although there is a loss of 
rental income at the edge of the city (less land is developed), there is a gain in interior rents 
owing to an increase in the level of the land-rent function. Total land rent is maximized when 
these two effects are equal. This growth control model therefore depicts a conflict of interests 
between landowners and renters: the first group demanding less development and the second 
demanding more. The solution obtained depends on which group is assumed to have more 
political power. Traditionally, it has been more common to maintain the assumption that 
landowners dominate the political process (see, e.g., Brueckner, 1999 and Brueckner and Lai, 
1996), with the boundaries being chosen in their best interests. In this case, the government is 
assumed to maximize total land rent, which can be expressed as: 
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The derivative of this expression with respect to the boundary li is: 
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Where the first part of the expression is the gain in boundary rents derived from the increase in 
the amount of developed land, and the second part is the loss in rental income due to a reduction 
in the level of the land-rent function. Now, substituting the expressions for ci and ∂ci/∂li  and 
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setting the results so that they are equal to zero, we obtain the following expression for the 
spatial size of the community: 
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Expression (6) says that urban expansion depends on influences that are specific to each 
community (indexed by i), since urban expansion will be higher: the greater the wage premium 
and/or the level of community amenities (∂li /∂wi >0 and ∂li /∂ai>0), and the lower the 
disamenity effects created by the new residents (∂li /∂βi <0). Urban expansion also depends on 
area-wide influences (indexed by k), since it will be higher: the lower the wage premium and/or 
the level of amenities in the other communities (∂li /∂wk <0 and ∂li /∂ak<0), the higher (the lower) 
the population and number of municipalities ( ki Nl
~/ ∂∂  >0 and ∂li /∂nk <0), the higher the 
disamenity effects of additional residents in other places (∂li /∂βk >0), and the higher travel costs 
in the area (∂li /∂tk >0). As explained above, we will not focus on these inter-regional 
differences. However, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of their effects we will control for 
all the area-wide influences by including area fixed effects in the equation.  
 
2.2. Homeowners vs renters and land developers 
 
The model presented in the previous section assumes that absentee landowners control the 
political process. It is interesting to note that, as Brueckner and Lai (1996) show, home-owners 
(who are residents in the community) would still have more incentives to restrain growth than 
renters, although fewer than the absentee landowners. Therefore, we can naturally extend the 
same hypotheses developed above to a model that assumes that homeowners control the 
political process, i.e., the so-called ‘homeowner-voter’ hypothesis, proposed by Fischel (1990). 
However, in practice, it is not entirely clear that homeowners have such great political weight, 
for several reasons. First, although it is clear that the median voter is a homeowner in most 
cases, each individual renter may have more influence if the correct model focus on swing 
voters or on interest group lobbying, as Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2006 and 2007) suggest. 
Second, in practice, renters may constitute a larger group than is typically assumed, since there 
may be a group of relatively immobile new buyers that are also affected negatively by rising 
rents. 
 
The way for a renter’s influence to be taken into account in the urban growth model (see, e.g., 
Brueckner, 1999) is to assume that the local government maximizes a weighted sum of renter 
7
utility and land values, with weights λi and (1 – λ i), respectively6. In this case (omitting again 
the algebra for reasons of space), the spatial size of the city is: 
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Expression (7) says that, in addition to the factors identified above, urban expansion will also be 
higher, the greater the political weight of renters in a municipality ( 0/ >∂∂ ii λl ). The political 
weight given to renters will depend both on their number and on the political clout of a renter 
relative to that of a homeowner.  
 
The evidence regarding the ‘homeowner hypothesis’ is scarce even in the US. Some authors 
argue that this is because traditional analyses considered the owners of land as a monolithic 
block, ignoring the differences between owners of developed land (i.e., homeowners) and 
owners of undeveloped land or land developers (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2006 and 2007). 
However, as these authors also note, land rent maximization gives some political weight to 
owners of undeveloped land, since relative group power is proportional to the stake of the group 
in terms of rents. These authors suggest that this is consistent with modeling political power 
through the use of a lobbying model à la Grossman and Helpman (1994). We believe, however, 
that in many instances the owners of undeveloped land might have more power than is actually 
suggested by their share in total land rents. Note that, given that undeveloped land property 
tends to be highly concentrated, land developers may be a rather small group. In line with 
Olson’s (1971) thinking, they might find it easier (compared to the homeowners) to organize 
themselves into group to lobby the local planner7. 
 
In the context of the present model, a simple way to account for this possibility is to assume that 
the local government gives a weight of one to the gain in rental income at the city boundary 
                                                          
6 Our model does not explicitly model the political economy of urban growth boundaries. However, it 
allows for an interpretation of which groups might have some power to influence this outcome and, 
therefore it helps in identifying the main political forces that should be taken into account in the empirical 
analysis. There is a remarkable scarcity of political economy models of land-use regulations, exceptions 
being the papers by Glaeser et al. (2005) and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2007), which focus on the 
effects on regulatory intensity instead than on the amount of developable land. However, the predictions 
of these models regarding the effect of the different groups have the same flavor than ours.  
 
7 Of course, the fact that such a small group of people is able to influence disproportionately local 
government decisions suggest the possibility of corruption. It should be clear, however, that we are not 
able to measure corruption in our empirical exercise, but only urban expansion, which might have 
involved or not bribing by developers to politicians. There are some recent papers on local government 
corruption (e.g., Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004, Bertrand and Kramarz, 2007, Ferraz and Finan, 2007) 
but few of them deal with corruption in land-use regulations (see, e.g., Glaeser et al. 2005). 
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when more land is developed (which benefits land developers), and a weight of 10 << iη   to 
the loss in rental income due to a reduction in the level of the land-rent function (which benefits 
homeowners), thereby increasing the ‘relative’ power of land developers.  So we simply 
multiply the second term in (5) by that iη  parameter and operate as before to obtain the spatial 
size of the city: 
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Note that when iη =1 (i.e., both groups have the same weight), expressions (8) and (6) are 
identical, but that when 1<iη  (i.e., land developers have more political clout) the spatial size 
of the city is bigger than suggested in (6). When only land developers count ( iη =0), it can be 
shown that the spatial size of the city is equal to the market size, which could be obtained by 
equating the bid-rent function to agricultural rents, assumed as being zero. Thus, our equation 
will include proxies for the political clout of owners of undeveloped land. 
 
2.3. Open space benefits and interjurisdictional spillovers 
 
Let’s assume now that the residents in one community also derive benefits from open space8. 
These benefits are modeled in a very simple manner, assuming that they are equal to 
)( iii lγ −l , where il  is total land area under the jurisdiction of the local government, )( ii l−l  
is the amount of open space, and iγ  is the value of open space, which might differ from one 
community to another. Let’s assume that the resident in one community also derives utility from 
open space in the rest of the area, )( kkk ln −l , but that the utility provided by one unit of 
regional open space is only kθγ , with 10 ≤≤ θ . The utility of the mobile renter is now 
)()( kkkkiiiiiiii lnθγlγNβacu −+−+−+= ll . Maximizing total land value we obtain: 
 
kkii
kkkkiikkii
i
tφγθβ
Nφγγθawaw
l ++−+
+−−+−−+=
))1((2
~))(1()()(
'
'll
 where 
1
)1('
−
+−+=
k
kkk
k n
tγθβ
φ  (9) 
 
                                                          
8 See Evenson (2003) and Evenson and Wheaton (2003) for discussions that consider the possible 
influence of the value of open space on urban expansion. 
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The effect of total land area on the community is positive ( 0/ >∂∂ iil l ), meaning that the 
effect of open space is similar to that of any other amenity: if people value it, there will be more 
pressure to develop. The total land area of the community does not have any effect on urban 
expansion when open space is a purely regional public good (i.e., 1=θ ). Note also that an 
increase in the degree of publicness of open space θ (assuming symmetry in the endowment and 
value of open space) increases the spatial size of the city since it makes no sense to care more 
about open space in the community than in the rest of the urban area. The effect of an increase 
in the value of open space ( ii γl ∂∂ / ) is, however, less clear, since it has an effect on the 
amenity value (in the numerator) but it also increases the disamenity effect of population (this 
effect increases from iβ to ii γθβ )1( −+ , in the denominator). To account for these influences 
we will include in the equation the total amount of land in the community ( il ) and several 
measures of the proportion of land that is more valuable (a proxy for iγ ). 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Empirical specification 
 
Let’s assume that in period 0, after winning elections, the new government of i looks at the 
structural traits of the municipality and decides on the desired amount of developable land: 
 
 kiiiiiiiii fzαγααηαλαβαaαwαl ++++++++= 0,80,70,60,50,40,30,20,10,* l  (10) 
 
where 0,iw   is the wage premium that can be obtained in municipality i, 0,ia  are amenities, 
0,iβ  are the  disamenity (or amenity) effects caused by new residents, 0,iλ  and 0,iη  are the 
political weights of renters and owners of non-developed land, proxied by a set of socio-
demographic and political variables, 0,il   is  total land area under municipal jurisdic-tion, 0,iγ  
are open space benefits,  0,iz  are other municipal-specific drivers, and kf  are area fixed 
effects, capturing possible influences that are common to all the municipalities in a given area. 
 
Then, let’s assume for the moment that the actual amount of developable land 0,il  is lower than 
*
0,il  and that the government decides to eliminate this deficit as soon as possible. Given that it 
takes time to amend existing planning documents or to draft new ones, at the end of the term-of-
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office the government has eliminated a portion ρ  of the initial deficit. This description of the 
decision-making process can be summarized in the following equation: 
 
 iiii εllρl +−= )(Δ 0,0,*  (11) 
where iε  is an error term with the usual properties. Now, substituting (10) into (11) we obtain 
the following equation:  
 
ikiiiiiiiiii εfzδγδδηδλδβδaδwδ lδl ++++++++++= 0,80,70,60,50,40,30,20,10,0Δ l (12) 
 
where ρδ −=0  is the adjustment coefficient, and the α  coefficients in (10), measuring the 
long-run effect of a variable on the desired amount of developable land, can be obtained by 
dividing theδ coefficients by ρ . There are certain advantages to be gained from estimating 
equation (11) instead of using only a cross-section of data on developable land. First, by relating 
the growth in developable land to the initial traits of each municipality we are able to attenuate 
the endogeneity problems which plague cross-sectional analyses. Second, this approach allows 
us to concentrate on the actual decision taken by the local governments, which involves passing 
a new land regulation allowing a certain amount of new land to be developed. 
 
3.2. Econometrics 
 
The estimation of equation (12) entails two main problems, namely, the difficulty of controlling 
and measuring all the area-wide influences on local development, and the possible estimation 
bias caused by the censoring of the dependent variable. 
 
Area-wide influences. As expressions (6) to (9) show, the amount of land assigned for 
development does not depend only on municipal traits but also on area-wide influences 
including, for example, the population, income, amenities, commuting costs and number of 
municipalities in the area. It could also be argued that the increase in developable land should 
depend not only on the deficit of land at year zero (expression (11)) but also on forecasted 
demand growth, which may also become higher, the higher the population and income growth 
for the entire area are during the period considered. We could have dealt with this problem by 
attempting to quantify all these area-wide influences. However, such a procedure would be 
plagued by many problems, such as the endogeneity of area-wide demand variables (i.e., a 
higher supply of land might also stimulate demand), or the omission of other variables. For this 
reason, we decided to control for all these influences by including a set of area fixed effects in 
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the regression. Although it is true that we will not now be able to obtain results for the area-
wide effect, it is also the case that the coefficients obtained from this intra-regional analysis for 
the municipality-specific variables will not be affected by the econometric problems stated 
above.  
 
To create the set of fixed effects used in our regression we first divided all the Spanish territory 
into a mutually exclusive number of areas. We define three types of area: urban, non-urban and 
tourist. Urban areas include all the municipalities located less than 30 km from a central city 
with more than 100,000 residents or located less than 15 km from a central city with more than 
50,000 but fewer than 100,000 residents. This criterion is similar to that used in previous 
analyses (see, e.g., Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2004). In total, we identified 64 urban 
areas. Non-urban areas include all the municipalities in a province (NUTS-II EU regions) that 
are neither urban nor tourist. Since there are 50 provinces, there are also 50 non-urban areas. 
Tourist areas are the non-coastal municipalities located less than 10 km from a main tourist 
resort, plus the coastal municipalities located less than 10 km from a main coastal tourist resort, 
plus the non-coastal municipalities located at less than 5 km from any coastal municipality 
included in the tourist area. A main tourist resort is a municipality with a tourist index higher 
than 300 that is not located less than 10 km from another tourist municipality with the same trait 
but with a higher tourist index. The tourist index is computed as the average per capita local 
business tax revenues coming from tourist-related activities (e.g., hotels, restaurants, etc.), and 
is expressed in relation to the average (see Table A.1 in the Annex). Using this procedure, we 
identified 99 tourist areas. 
 
Censored data. Recall that to justify the adjustment process in (10) we assumed that the actual 
amount of developable land 0,il  is lower than 
*
0,il . However, this may not be the case in all 
municipalities. In some cases, the amount of land put on the market by previous governments, 
and still vacant, may be sufficient given demand forecasts. In other cases, the new government 
may consider the amount of land assigned for development by the previous government to be 
too high. But, even if the desired amount of developable land is higher than the actual amount, 
the local government will find it very difficult to convert land already declared developable into 
open spaces. The reason for this irreversibility of status is that when a plot of land is declared 
developable its price increases abruptly, creating a (non-realized) capital gain for its owner, 
which is protected under Spanish law. The only option open to a government wishing to revert 
this situation is to buy open space at its market value, a transaction that is not very common in 
Spain, given the shortage of local financial resources. Therefore, although in many cases the 
desired increase *Δ il  is negative, the real increase ilΔ  appears to be zero. In fact, around 25% 
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of the observations of ilΔ  in our database are zero. This means that our dependent variable is 
censored and that OLS estimates of equation (12) will be biased if the decision to expand 
developable land is correlated with the desired increase in the amount of developable land, 
something that is plausible a priori. 
 
To solve this problem we estimate a Tobit model following the two-step procedure proposed by 
Heckman (1976 and 1979). In the first step we estimate a selection equation using a probit 
model of the decision to expand the amount of developable land, where the dependent variable 
is an indicator equal to one if ilΔ >0 and equal to zero if ilΔ ≤0. The explanatory variables for 
this first step are all those included in (12). The results of the probit estimation are used to 
construct the “inverse of the Mill’s ratio”, which is then included in an OLS estimation of 
equation (12) using only those observations with  ilΔ ≥0.  
 
3.3. Variables and data 
 
Sample. Equation (12) is estimated using data for 2,212 Spanish municipalities in the period 
1999-2003. Spain has more than 9,000 municipalities, but most of them are quite small. We 
obtained land-use and census data for all of them, but we lacked important economic data for 
municipalities with fewer than a 1,000 residents (e.g., income). Moreover, in the interval 
between 1,000 and 20,000 residents, our database only provides fiscal data for a sample of 
representative municipalities. Additionally, we had to eliminate a few municipalities from the 
sample because either we lacked political data or the data we had was unreliable. In the end, we 
were thus restricted to a sample of 2,212. Our feeling is that this sample is representative of the 
full population because the vast majority of large municipalities (those with over 5,000 
residents) are present and a number of checks run on the smaller ones suggest that sample 
values of most variables do not differ greatly from the population average. 
 
The period analyzed is also a particularly good one because, as discussed at the beginning of 
this paper, urban expansion has been very high during these years. Moreover, the huge database 
used in the analysis could not be assembled for previous periods. Our land-use data covers the 
period 1994-2003, but we had problems in finding some of the variables for years prior to 1999. 
The period of analysis, 1999-2003, corresponds exactly with the municipal term-of-office, 
which in Spain lasts the same four years for all the municipalities.  
 
Data on developable land. The data used to measure the amount of developable land comes 
from the Spanish national property assessment agency (Dirección General del Catastro, DGC) 
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and arises as a byproduct of the assessment process which this agency performs on all properties 
in the country. Although value reassessments are only carried out from time to time, the update 
in the traits of each property (and thus its classification as developed, developable or not 
developable) and the inclusion of new properties (either buildings or land plots) is performed 
yearly. According to this agency, the measure of developable land used includes: “all land 
classified in planning documents as developed”, i.e., land already built on, plus “that land 
considered developable according to planning documents or other land-use regulation 
instruments that develops it” (DCG, 2007. p.1). This means that the variable does not account 
for the land that has been reserved in general land-use plans, but which will not be ready for 
development until it is included in a more detailed planning document. We believe that this 
definition is very appropriate for our purposes here, because it implies that future development 
of the land we account for rests primarily in the hands of the developers9. 
 
Thus, the variable used to measure developable land has been constructed by summing the built-
up and vacant land areas (the information for both variables being taken from the 
aforementioned source). It should be noted that this is the only statistical source of data 
covering all Spain that can be used to measure the land-use category of undeveloped urban land 
plots. For example, the very rich data provided by the aerial photographs of the Corine Land 
Cover project (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006) could not be used in our case because it only 
measures what can be seen (land already developed) but not what has been approved by the 
local government but which does not yet physically exist (land assigned for development). 
Recall that here it is this last variable that has to be analyzed, because it is the main land-use 
regulatory decision taken by local governments.  
 
However, this variable presents a number of peculiar traits. First, as a result of the irreversibility 
of land-use decisions (recall the discussion in the previous section), the increase in this variable 
is always positive or zero. Second, land-use changes only happen from time to time, the reason 
being that they are both time-consuming and potentially conflictive. This means that this 
variable does not evolve continuously from one year to the next but rather it jumps forward in 
certain years. These traits indicate that we should not try to model the yearly changes in this 
variable, and so instead we chose to use the growth in developable land throughout the term-of-
office (1999-2003). This has been done at no cost in terms of explanatory variables, because 
most of them can only be measured at one data point during this period (e.g., census data or 
                                                          
9 See Riera et al. (1991) for a description of urban land-use planning instruments in Spain. As is explained 
there, general land-use plans in Spain are updated only after long periods (e.g., 20 years) and detailed 
development regulations are then required in order to convert reserved land into land ready for 
development. However, once the land is ready for development, the granting of building permits is 
virtually automatic.  
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political data, which is only recorded after one election). The explanatory variables have been 
measured for 1999 or for the nearest year (e.g., census variables are for 2001). The dependent 
variable is in log form, so it has to be interpreted as a growth rate. The other variables, with the 
exception of dummies and ratios, are also in log form. The log specification is the one that fits 
the data best and, moreover, it has also been used elsewhere (Evenson, 2003; Evenson and 
Wheaton, 2003). 
 
Income (w) and amenities (a). We include here per capita income of residents in the 
municipality (income), dummy variables indicating whether the municipality is a suburb or not 
(suburb) and whether it has a coastal location (coast), and also the distance in kilometers to the 
center of the urban area (distance-to-center) and to the coast (distance-to-coast). Table A.1 in 
the Annex provides details about variable definitions and data sources used. 
 
Disamenity (amenity) effects of growth (β). There are many reasons that might explain why 
newcomers affect the utility of existing residents. One obvious reason is that new residents can 
have an effect on taxes paid as well as on the costs of local public services. Of course, the 
impact on the standard of living of existing residents might be more general, such as newcomers 
simply affecting the beauty and communal character of the place. In this paper we use two 
different procedures to account for these effects.  
 
The first procedure involves selecting variables that are deemed to be related to the decline in 
the standard of living in the community as its size increases. First, the so-called flight-from-
blight hypothesis (Mieszkowsi and Mills,1993; Downs, 1999; Gordon and Richardson, 1997; 
Ewing, 1997; Brueckner, 2000 and 2001) says that high income people might choose a 
community in the suburbs in order to isolate themselves from the problems of central cities and 
that, once these high income communities are created, growth should be restricted in order to 
avoid low income people entering the community and eroding its amenity values. The paper by 
Evenson (2003) finds evidence of this effect in the US. Note, however, that our theoretical 
model suggests that high income in itself is a reason to relocate to a given place, leading us to 
expect a positive effect for this variable. So, here we add an interaction to the equation between 
income and the suburb dummy (income × suburb), in the expectation that the negative effect of 
income will only be apparent in this type of community. Second, some authors (see, e.g., 
Evenson, 2003) also argue that past growth is related to this disamenity effect - the reason for 
this behavior being that residents might be more aware of the decline in their standard of living 
given the concentration in time of the arrival of newcomers. So we include in the equation the 
population and housing growth rates in the four-year period prior to the one we are analyzing 
(lagged population growth and lagged housing growth). The inclusion of housing growth aims 
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at accounting for the effects of growth in the non-resident population, which could also cause a 
disamenity effect. Third, we also include in the regression the population density (density) in 
order to account for the possibility that denser areas are highly congested, meaning that further 
resident arrivals will have a particularly erosive effect on amenities there. Fourth, we also 
control for population size (population) which accounts for the possibility that disamenity 
effects of new residents appear after an ‘optimal’ size has been reached (Capello and Camagni, 
2000).  
 
The second procedure involves quantifying the effect that new residents have on the local 
finances of Spanish municipalities. We take into account both the effects on the revenue side 
and on the cost side computing the net-fiscal-impact of a new resident as:  
 
 net-fiscal-impacti = Δ own revenuesi + Δgrantsi – Δcostsi  (13) 
 
On the revenue side, the items that are potentially affected by urban expansion are: the vehicle 
license tax, user charges, impact fees, the tax on building activity, the tax on land transmission, 
and the property tax. We consider, however, that the impact of a new resident is potentially the 
same across municipalities in all these instruments with the exception of the property tax. In this 
case, the impact might differ quite simply because the assessed value of new houses does; our 
measure of property taxes contributed by an additional resident (Δproperty tax) is precisely the 
product of the average Spanish property tax rate and the average assessed value of a new urban 
unit in each municipality (See Table A.1 for details of the calculation and data sources). Grant 
revenues in Spain are also affected by population growth and the magnitude of the increase also 
differs across municipalities. The main grant received by the Spanish municipalities is 
unconditional, 75% of which is distributed using a weighted population formula (see Bosch and 
Solé-Ollé, 2005) and which reads as follows: 
 
 ON ij iijji GNgdψG += ∑  (14) 
 
Where iG  is the amount received from this grant, jψ  are population weights, which increase 
with population (e.g., one resident in a municipality with fewer than 5,000 residents has a 
weight of 1 while in a city bigger than 500,000 this weight is 2.8), ijd  is a dummy equal to one 
if the municipality i is in the population bracket j, 
Ng is the average grant per adjusted resident 
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and OiG are grants received from variables other than population (assumed invariant with 
respect to population growth). The marginal grant received can be computed as: 
 
 Nijji gdψgrants =Δ  (15) 
 
We also computed a second variable related to grants which is not included in the computation 
of the net-fiscal-impact (13) but added separately to the regression. This variable captures the 
increase in per capita grants which occurs when a municipality jumps from a lower to a higher 
bracket as its population grows. Of course, in practice there are no municipalities in this 
marginal situation. Note, however, that as local planning used to be based on the long-run 
population size that the municipality wished to attain, planned future population growth cannot 
be discrete. So it is natural to assume that local politicians will take into account the potential 
future gain in per capita grants stemming from any future bracket jump. However, since it may 
take many years to achieve the planned level of population, it is also natural to consider that the 
incentive to take this gain into account is lower, the further the actual population is from the 
nearest threshold. The expression for this variable is: 
 
 Δgrants-per-residenti iNiijjjj ij NgNNψψd
1
11 )
~()( −++ −−= ∑  (16) 
 
Note that expression (16) assumes that the gain in transfers is higher: the greater the size of the 
‘jump’ )( 1 jj ψψ −+ , the lower the distance between population and the next threshold 
( iij NN −+1~ ), and the higher the population size. 
 
On the expenditure side, it is often asserted that population growth contributes to a deterioration 
in the quality of public services and/or to an increase in the cost of providing them (Ladd, 
1992). This can happen if new residents put existing facilities under too much pressure and new 
ones have to be constructed. Costs may also rise if new developments are less dense than 
previous ones (Ladd, 1994) or if a bigger city has a harsher environment (e.g., rising crime rates 
or other social problems), thereby making it more costly to finance current service levels. To 
compute the marginal effects of new residents on costs (Δcosts), we depart from the expenditure 
needs index designed for Spanish municipalities in Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) and data for the 
first year of the period. The variables and coefficients of this earlier index were selected after 
estimating an expenditure equation with a sample that is very similar to the one we use here. 
One interesting trait of this index is that one of the variables is weighted population. Although 
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the weights are also related to population size (as in the case of the grant), the shape of the 
profile is different: per capita costs decrease abruptly for low population sizes (below the 5,000 
threshold) and increase afterwards but flatten out completely above the 50,000-resident 
threshold. The other variables considered in the index (i.e., %  unemployed, % immigrants, 
responsibilities, visitors) also help contribute in giving variation to this variable. We computed 
the effect of an additional resident on expenditure needs using the following expression: 
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The first term of expression (17) is expenditure on each new resident, computed as the product 
of an expenditure needs index (  / eei , which is equal to one when the municipality has 
expenditure needs equal to the average) and average per capita spending (  s ). The second term 
in (17) is the proportional change in per capita needs when population increases, and is bigger 
the bigger the size of the population. 
 
Finally, note that in the above discussion we have implicitly assumed that the local government 
is responsive to the interests of its residents, so it takes into account both the additional revenues 
and costs created by new development10. However, it is also possible that while local politicians 
consider the positive impact of development, namely increased revenues, they ignore the 
negative impact, i.e., increasing costs. This sort of fiscal illusion may occur, for example, if 
politicians have a short time horizon and development revenues are obtained time before higher 
costs are experienced. Note, for example, that the cost variables introduced in the previous 
paragraphs are deemed to measure the permanent or long-term effect of a new resident on costs, 
and that the revenue variables measure the permanent or long-term effect of revenues. However, 
in our calculation of the revenue variables we have discarded certain revenue sources because 
they do not change with population and/or they are equal across municipalities. The revenue 
sources not used in the above calculation, and those that are more prone to create this sort of 
fiscal illusion, are the tax on building activity and the tax on land transmission which are both 
paid on a one-off basis. Another source of fiscal illusion is the charge imposed on developers, 
who must give a proportion of the developed land, which might range from 10 to 30% 
depending on the region, to the local government. This land can be used to build local facilities 
or social housing, but many municipalities simply decide to sell it on the market to raise 
                                                          
10 Recently, a number of papers have argued that property tax financing in the US also fosters urban 
expansion (Brueckner and Kim, 2003, Song and Zenou, 2006) because, with this system of finance, new 
development does not cover the marginal costs. We are not able to test this effect since Spanish 
municipalities have no choice regarding whether or not to use property taxation. 
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additional funds. As discussed in the introduction, Spanish governments have often been 
blamed for putting too much land on to the market simply to obtain these short-term revenues; 
we will term this the Revenue-machine hypothesis. Note that this hypothesis is extremely 
difficult to test,  since these instruments have the same effect across municipalities; of course it 
might be thought that the revenues will rise the higher the level of development, but the fact that 
intended development is our dependent variable rules this possibility out. The way we test this 
hypothesis, therefore, is to assume that some municipalities will be more prone than others to 
account only for the short-term benefits of growth. These municipalities will be those that are in 
a weaker financial position, namely those that have a higher debt stock and a lower current 
surplus.  
 
Political weight of renters and owners of undeveloped land (λ and η). The model presented 
in Section 3 clearly predicts that the increase in the amount of developable land will be higher, 
the more numerous and powerful the renters and owners of the undeveloped land in a 
municipality are. We will include the proportion of families that are renters in order to control 
for this effect (% renters). This variable presents a problem in the case examined here, since the 
rate of homeownership in Spain is particularly high, no municipality having more than 20% of 
renters. Therefore, this group is too small for us to assume that it might have much influence on 
local politics. This is the reason why we also introduced the proportion of voting population 
between 25 and 40 years (% residents-25to40) in the equation. People in this age group make up 
the majority of new buyers and, given the high level of attachment to the home-municipality, 
they have a clear preference for buying in their own municipality. Therefore, they constitute a 
sizeable voting group that should be given some weight in the local political process. 
 
We also include a number of political variables in the equation. We expect that some political 
parties are more sensitive than others to the interests of renters and owners of undeveloped land. 
The expectation is that parties to the right of the political spectrum will allow more land to be 
developed, since it might well be the case, for example, that rightwing candidates are land 
owners or even land developers and have, thus, vested interests in land development and/or the 
housing industry. The same argument applies to certain local parties that gained the mayoralty 
with the express purpose of initiating huge development projects. To account for this we include 
two dummies that measure the ideology of the mayor: a center-mayor is given a value of one 
representing a party or parties that we consider to occupy the center of the political spectrum, 
while a right-mayor is given a value of one representing the parties that are right of center; the 
excluded category, a left-mayor is attributed to parties that are left of center. We also include in 
the equation a dummy which identifies a mayor that belongs to a local party (local-party-
mayor). It is difficult to make a prediction concerning the local parties as this category is more 
19
heterogeneous, including parties with vested interests in development as well as parties founded 
with the aim of fighting development (i.e., environmentalists). 
 
We also expect that the incentives to disregard the interests of residents and to heed solely those 
of a handful of powerful land developers depend on the quality of local democracy. We will 
take into account the fact that local governments that do not face a serious electoral threat will 
care less about the wishes of residents. A number of papers have recently shown that the degree 
of electoral competition may be relevant in explaining the influence of vested interests in public 
policies, leading sometimes to the adoption of inefficient policies (see, e.g., Besley et al., 2006, 
on the positive effect of electoral competition on the growth of the US states). The study 
completed by Solé-Ollé (2006) shows that electoral competition has a marked effect on fiscal 
policies pursued by Spanish municipalities. It is natural to expect that competition will also have 
an impact on urban expansion: more competitive communities should in principle be expected 
to develop less. To account for this we include a measure of electoral competition, computed as 
the absolute distance between 50% and the vote obtained in the last elections by the party or 
parties in the local government (% vote-margin). We also include a measure of turnout at the 
last municipal election (% electoral-turnout) in the expectation that in communities with a 
higher turnout democratic control will be greater and, therefore, it should be more difficult for 
politicians to cater to the interests of developers. We will also consider certain interactions 
between the ideological dummies and the electoral margin, in order to account for the 
possibility that parties with different ideologies react differently to electoral competition, as 
Solé-Ollé (2006) suggests. The idea here is that the higher the margin is, the greater the freedom 
enjoyed by the parties to apply their political program; if the platform of the political left/right is 
openly against/for development a left/rightwing party may restrain/promote more growth when 
the margin is higher. Finally, we also include a coalition dummy (coalition) in the expectation 
of finding a negative effect on urban expansion, derived from the fact that coalitions usually 
find it extremely difficult to agree to projects that are particularly conflictive. 
 
Open land benefits. To account for this factor we include in the equation the total amount of 
land under the jurisdiction of the municipality (total-land-area) and the proportion of open land 
that is not in agricultural use, considering separately the proportion of land dedicated to forest 
(% forest-land) and other uses (% other-non-agricultural-land). As explained in the theoretical 
section, we expect a positive effect for the total amount of land while the expected effect of the 
various variables measuring quality of open space is not clear.  
 
Other influences. Finally, we include some additional control variables that do not fit 
particularly neatly with the explanations given above, but which, nevertheless, we think might 
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have an influence on the amount of developable land. First, we should consider the possibility 
of communities growing without the need to expanding their spatial size. This may be done, for 
example, by redeveloping old districts or by encouraging the owners of unused houses to put 
them on the market (either by renting or selling). We will measure this effect with the 
proportion of old and empty houses (% old-houses and % empty-houses), since the more of 
these there are, the easier it will be to rebuild and, hence, there will be less need to allow for 
more land to be developed. Second, some communities might want to develop simply to create 
employment in the building industry, suggesting that development will be higher in places with 
a high unemployment rate (% unemployed).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
The results of the estimation are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 provides the results 
obtained when the equation is estimated for the full sample of municipalities while Table 2 
provides detailed results for each of the three sub-samples (urban, non-urban and tourist 
municipalities).  
 
General results (All the municipalities). The estimation contained in the first column of Table 1 
focuses on the set of variables that seek to identify the Disamenity (amenity) effects of growth, 
and excludes the variables related to Political factors. The second column includes both sets of 
variables, while the third one includes interactions between some of the political variables. In all 
the specifications we have also included variables that account for Income and amenities and for 
Open space benefits, for Other influences, and also the lagged developable-land-area, the 
inverse of Mill’s ratio and the area dummies. The explanatory capacity of the model is 
reasonable for cross-sectional data, with the R2 lying between 0.25 and 0.38. At the bottom of 
the table we include F tests on the joint statistical significance of all the variables as well as that 
for groups of variables. The different groups of variables were always found to be jointly 
significant, with the exception of the dummies for the non-urban areas, which were not and have 
been excluded from the specifications presented in the table. 
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Table 1. Determinants of new municipal developable land; 
dependent variable: Δ developable land area; period: 1999-2003  
term-of-office. Sample: all municipalities (N=2,212); Tobit estimation  
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
a.- Income and amenities 
income   0.202 (2.761) ***  0.235 (3.030) ***  0.225 (2.977) *** 
suburb   0.029 (1.945)*  0.021 (1.776)*  0.020 (1.721)* 
distance-to-central-city -0.008 (-1.850)* -0.011 (-1.688)* -0.013 (-1.694)* 
coast   0.023 (1.745)*  0.012 (2.967)***  0.012 (2.876)*** 
distance-to-coast -0.011 (-1.955)* -0.014 (-2.544)** -0.015 (-2.432)*** 
b.- Disamenity (amenity) effects of growth 
income × suburb -0.044 (1.866)* -0.041 (1.809)* -0.040 (1.812)* 
lagged population growth -0.030 (-1.321) -0.034 (-1.576) -0.032 (-1.465) 
lagged housing growth -0.012 (-2.175)** -0.017 (-2.356)** -0.020 (-2.259)** 
density  0.042 (2.654)***  0.021 (2.237)**  0.023 (2.258)** 
population -0.014 (-0.721) -0.001 (-0.455) -0.001 (-0.425) 
net-fiscal-impact  0.002 (1.423)  0.001 (0.654)  0.001 (0.633) 
Δtransfers-per-resident  0.056 (2.072)**  0.039 (1.348)  0.038 (1.454) 
debt  0.014 (1.842)*  0.009 (2.105) **  0.008 (2.145) ** 
surplus -0.026 (-1.951)* -0.024 (-2.205)** -0.025 (-2.222)** 
c.- Political factors 
%  renters --.--  0.129 (1.359)  0.129 (1.255) 
%  residents-25to40 --.--  1.001 (2.310) **  1.020 (2.258)** 
center-mayor --.--  0.044 (2.468)**  0.015 (2.511)*** 
right-mayor --.--   0.052 (2.598)**  0.021 (2.661)*** 
local-party-mayor --.-- -0.030 (-1.026) -0.009 (-1.140) 
coalition --.-- -0.005 (-0.284) -0.004 (-0.510) 
%  electoral- turnout --.-- -0.062 (-2.110)** -0.058 (-2.036)** 
% vote-margin --.--  0.150 (2.340)** --.-- 
left-mayor × % vote-margin --.-- --.-- -0.084 (-1.356) 
center-mayor × % vote-margin --.-- --.--  0.144 (1.605) 
right-mayor × % vote-margin --.-- --.--  0.149 (1.904)* 
local-party-mayor× % vote-margin --.-- --.-- -0.010 (-1.724)* 
Notes: (1) All explanatory variables (with the exception of %s) are measured in logs and 
refer to the base year 1999. (2) ***, ** and * = statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 
90% levels. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
d.- Open space benefits 
total-land-area 0.044 (5.015)*** 0.044 (5.315)*** 0.045 (5.412)*** 
%  forest-land -0.057 (-2.308)** -0.056 (-2.478)*** -0.052 (-2.433)** 
% other-non-agricultural-land -0.037 (-2.540)** -0.036 (-2.054)*** -0.038 (-2.114)** 
e.- Other influences 
%  old-houses -0.193 (-1.925)
* -0.187 (-3.644)*** -0.176 (-3.259)*** 
%  empty-houses  0.145 (2.140)
 **  0.133 (1.593)  0.135 (1.401) 
%  unemployed  0.422 (1.316)  0.462 (0.598)  0.685 (0.514) 
developable-land-area -0.288 (-6.840)
*** -0.275 (-4.760)*** -0.285 (-4.520)*** 
inverse of Mill’s ratio  0.095 (17.119)***  0.095 (16.543)***  0.099 (16.584)*** 
urban-area-dummies (64) YES YES YES 
non-urban-area-dummies (50) NO NO NO 
tourist-area-dummies (99) YES YES YES 
adj.-R2 0.331 0.374 0.365 
F-est. (all variables) 6.038** 6.245** 6.124** 
F-est. (disamenity/amenity) 11.014** 13.411** 12..741** 
F-est. (political) 7.445** 6.998** 6.771** 
F-est. (open space benefits) 18.411** 17.521** 17.018** 
F-est. (other influences) 6.412** 6.666** 6.548** 
F-est. (urban area dummies) 9.140** 6.898** 6.785** 
F-est. (non-urban dummies) 3.038 3.245 2.124 
F-est. (tourist area dummies) 6.102** 6.133** 6.441** 
Notes: (1) All explanatory variables (with the exception of %s) are measured in logs and 
refer to the base year 1999. (2) ***, ** and * = statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 
90% levels. 
 
 
The results of Table 1 suggest the following. First, regarding Income and amenities, high 
income communities grow more than their low-income counterparts, suburbs grow more than 
city centers although more distant suburbs grow less (these two effects are significant only at 
the 90% level), the coastal municipalities grow more than the non-coastal ones and those that 
are far from the coast grow even less (the last two variables are statistically significant at the 
99% level once political variables are included). Second, regarding the Disamenity (amenity) 
effects of growth, high income suburbs grow less than other suburbs (although the effect is 
significant at the 90% level), communities that grew more in the past, both in terms of 
population and number of houses, place greater restrictions on more future urban growth 
(although the effect is only statistically significant in the case of previous housing growth), 
23
denser communities expand their spatial size more, suggesting that the way they reduce 
congestion is not by restricting population size but rather by becoming less dense. Third, the 
hypothesis that marginal revenues and costs influence the growth decisions of municipalities is 
rejected. Although they have the expected sign, neither the net-fiscal-impact nor the Δtransfers-
per-resident are statistically significant when all the other variables are included in the equation. 
The results regarding the breakdown of the net-fiscal-impact variable (not shown here for 
reasons of space) are no better: all the variables have the expected sign (positive in the case of 
Δproperty tax and Δgrants and negative in the case of Δcosts) but none of them are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Fourth, we find evidence in favor of the Revenue-machine 
hypothesis, since municipalities with a higher debt stock and a lower surplus put more land on 
the market. These results suggest that Spanish municipalities are short-sighted, placing a greater 
weight on the short-term revenues associated with development than on the medium or long-
term costs created by urban expansion. Fifth, both the share of renters (%renters) and that of 
new buyers (%residents-25to40) has a positive effect on urban expansion, although only in the 
second case is the coefficient statistically significant. Thus, the homevoter hypothesis cannot be 
completely discarded in the Spanish case, although it needs to be interpreted in a more flexible 
manner than in other countries: the collective that demands more development is not only 
current renters, but also potential new buyers that also live and vote in the municipality. 
 
Sixth, municipalities governed by center (center-mayor) and rightwing parties (right-mayor) 
allow more land to be developed than those governed by the left (which is the base category), 
and municipalities governed by the right allow a little bit more land to be developed than those 
governed by the center, and the difference between these two coeffi-cients is statistically 
significant. By looking at column (ii) of Table 1, we can see that the rate of growth of 
developable land during the period 1999-2003 would have been 5.2% higher in a municipality 
governed by the right party than in one governed by the left. To gauge the magnitude of this 
effect, recall that the average rate of growth in this period was 11.4%11.  
 
Neither municipalities governed by local parties (local-party-mayor) nor those controlled by a 
coalition (coalition) seem to grow more or less than others: in both cases the sign of the variable 
is negative but not statistically significant. Municipalities with a higher turnout (%electoral-
turnout) and a lower vote margin (%vote-margin) allow less land to be developed, so it seems 
that the quality of the local democracy, both in terms of participation and the degree of electoral 
                                                          
11 These differences are to be found between the parties located at the two extremes of the left-right 
spectrum since, as Table A.1 in the Annex shows, the main leftwing party in Spain (PSOE)  has been 
included in the center with the result that the left category is occupied by the most extreme leftwing 
parties. The reason for this grouping is not any a priori considerations about the ideology of this party, but 
rather it is justified by the results: in a separate regression we found that the coefficient for this party is 
not statistically different from that of other parties in the center category. 
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competition, is crucial for providing politicians with incentives to cater to the interests of the 
general population and not to those of the developers. Column (iii) of Table 1 includes some of 
the interactions between the vote margin and the ideological dummies. The results suggest that 
parties on the right always allow more land to be developed and that this behavior intensifies 
when the government faces no strong electoral competition (the margin is lower). This suggests 
that rightwing parties cater more to the interests of the developers, but as they may wish to stay 
in power, they will choose to attend to general interests when they risk losing the elections. This 
result, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the interaction coefficient is only 
statistically significant at the 90% level. In the case of center parties the interaction coefficient is 
also positive but not statistically significant. In the case of leftwing parties the effect of 
increasing the vote margin is negative, indicating that they cater to anti-development interests 
(e.g., environmentalism), and only when they risk losing the election do they allow more land to 
be developed; this coefficient, however, is not statistically significant. In the case of local 
parties, the sign of the interaction is negative and statistically significant (at the 90% level). This 
result can be interpreted in two possible ways: (i) if the local party is anti-development, it only 
caters to the general public when facing stiffer competition, or (ii) if the local party is pro-
development, a lower margin could mean that it has a higher probability of being replaced and, 
therefore, it only has one term-of-office to ‘take-the-money and run’. 
 
Eighth, communities having a larger amount of land under their jurisdiction (total-land-area) 
allow more land to be developed. However, the higher the environmental value placed on this 
land, as measured by the share of forest and other non-agricultural land (% forest-land and % 
other-non-agricultural-land), the lower the probability that it will be developed. So, it seems 
that the disamenity effect generated by new residents, through the erosion of open space 
benefits, dominates the demand-enhancing effect of valuable open space. 
 
Ninth, among other influences, we should highlight that communities with old houses (%old-
houses) need to put less land on the market, because they find it easier to rebuild. However, 
municipalities with a higher proportion of empty houses (%empty-houses) typically develop 
more; we interpret this as an indicator of decline in the center of these municipalities (i.e., the 
‘old town’). Finally, local governments seem not to be motivated by the desire to enhance the 
local economy when allowing more development, since the unemployment rate 
(%unemployment) was not statistically significant (although it had the expected positive sign). 
 
Tenth, there is evidence of sluggish adjustment in the decision to put more land on the market, 
since the coefficient on the existing stock of land (developable-land) is negative and statistically 
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient, around 0.3, suggests that local governments need 
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three terms-of-office to complete this adjustment, confirming that decisions of this nature are 
indeed very complex and lengthy12. The results also suggest that the decision to put more land 
on the market and the actual amount of land assigned for development are correlated, as 
suggested by the significance of the “inverse of Mill’s ratio”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Recently, the CEO of Fadesa, one of the main building firms in Spain, complained because of the long 
time needed to put more developable land on the market, which he assessed around an average of eight 
years (so two terms of office) compared with around two years (he said) in other European countries (La 
Vanguardia 24/10/2007). 
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Table 2. Determinants of new municipal developable land; 
dependent variable: Δ developable land area; period: 1999-2003 term-of-office. 
Samples: urban, non-urban and tourist municipalities; Tobit estimation  
 (i) Urban 
(N=567) 
(ii) Non-urb. 
(N =786) 
(iii) Tourist 
(N =619) 
a.- Income and amenities 
income  0.101  (2.113) **  0.234  (2.547)***  0.082  (2.411)*** 
suburb  0.026 (2.143)** --.-- --.-- 
distance-to-central-city -0.008 (-1.855)* --.-- --.-- 
coast   0.016 (1.881)*  0.010 (1.554)  0.024 (3.667)*** 
distance-to-coast -0.008 (-1.776)* -0.010 (-1.566) -0.019 (-2.776)*** 
b.- Disamenity (amenity) effects of growth 
income × suburb -0.021 (1.721) * --.-- --.-- 
lagged population growth -0.031  (-1.841)* -0,023  (-1.234) -0,010  (0.710) 
lagged housing growth -0.012  (-1.282) -0.006  (-1.231) -0.013  (-2.110)** 
density  0.026  (2.776)
***  0.019  (2.124)**  0.011  (1.975) ** 
population -0.003  (-0.518) -0.002  (-0.650) -0.003  (-0.624) 
net-fiscal-impact  0.004  (1.541)  0.002  (1.511)  0.006 (1.241) 
Δtransfers-per-resident  0.077  (1.605)  0.035  (1.264)  0.046 (1.025) 
Δproperty-tax --.-- --.--  0.001 (1.201) 
debt  0.010  (2.100)*  0.002  (1.014)  0.017 (1.985)** 
surplus -0.012  (-1.751)* -0.008  (-1.457) -0.024 (-2.224)** 
c.- Political factors 
% renters  0.145 (1.685)*  0.067 (1.200)  0.034 (1.054) 
%  residents-25to40  1.210 (2.341)***  0.747 (1.854)*  0.895 (2.211)** 
center-mayor  0.025 (2.123)**  0.025 (2.123)**  0.032 (2.241)** 
right-mayor  0.017 (2.234)**  0.029 (2.005)**  0.056 (2.569)*** 
local-party-mayor -0.035 (-1.374) -0.041 (-1.410)  0.022 (1.564) 
coalition -0.002 (-1.310) -0.001 (-1.091) -0.002 (-0.678) 
%  electoral- turnout -0.044 (-2.123)** -0.035 (-1.998)** -0.058 (-2.041)** 
% vote-margin  0.120 (2.332)***  0.166 (2.365)***  0.153 (2.415)** 
d.- Open space benefits 
total-land-area  0.044 (5.015)***  0.031 (6.541)*** 0.061 (5.412)*** 
%  forest-land -0.057 (-2.308)** -0.078 (-2.211)** -0.012 (-2.010)** 
% other-non-agricultural-land -0.037 (-2.540)*** -0.035 (-2.112)** -0.028  (-2.001)
** 
e.- Other influences 
%  old-houses -0.222 (-2.778)*** -0.110 (-2.100)**  0.091 (0.325) 
%  empty-houses  0.166 (1.155)  0.185 (1.844)*  0.085 (0.543) 
%  unemployed  0.210 (0.601)  0.776 (1.981)*  0.854 (2.223)** 
developable-land-area -0.218 (-5.883)
*** -0.312 (-4.543)*** -0.376 (-4.776)*** 
inverse of Mill’s ratio 0.110 (15.212)*** 0.092 (12.432)*** 0.088 (13.776)*** 
adj.-R2 0.394 0.360 0.291 
Notes: (1)  See Table 1; (2) Same controls as in Table 1. 
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 Results by type of municipality. Table 2 shows the results for urban, non-urban and tourist 
municipalities. For reasons of space we have omitted the results for the joint F-tests of the 
different groups of variables. The results obtained for the three categories are very similar to 
those presented in Table 1, both in terms of the overall performance of the model and of the 
concrete variables that proved to be significant. Therefore, we will concentrate only on the main 
differences between the three groups. First, note that the income effect is higher for the non-
urban municipalities than it is for their urban and tourist counterparts. This might be due to the 
fact that suburbs are not chosen because of wage differentials, since people living there can 
commute to the central city. In the case of tourist municipalities, people buy houses there to go 
on vacation so they also disregard the wage level. Second, note that lagged housing growth only 
has a statistically significant negative effect in the case of tourist areas and that now urban 
municipalities that are growing more in terms of population do in fact seem to allow less land to 
be developed. Third, regarding the fiscal variables, the results are the same as those reported 
above, but the Revenue-machine effect seems to be stronger in the case of tourist municipalities, 
where point estimates are twice those of urban municipalities and both variables are statistically 
significant at the 95% level. Fourth, the effect of renters and new housing buyers seems to be 
stronger in urban areas (in fact, renters are now statistically significant at the 90% level), which 
is precisely where housing affordability problems have been stronger. Fifth, the effect of the 
different political variables is maintained across the different samples, but the effect of ideology 
is much stronger in tourist areas: a rightwing tourist municipality would have grown during the 
period at a rate that was 5.6% higher than one governed by the left, while this differential in 
non-urban and urban areas is of 2.9% and 1.7%, respectively. The effect of turnout and electoral 
competition is also slightly stronger in tourist areas. Overall, it seems that the politics of urban 
development are more polarized in tourist areas than in the rest of the country and because of 
that, both the quality of the local democracy and the stiffness of electoral competition may have 
a substantial effect on the observed patterns of development in these areas. We should point out 
that this result is not at all surprising, since the most controversial episodes of excessive urban 
expansion and (sometimes) of local corruption have appeared in tourist areas. Finally, the 
results for the remaining variables are fairly similar across types, with the exceptions of old-
houses, which do not present any effects in tourist areas, and unemployment, which now has the 
expected positive and statistically significant effect, but only in non-urban and tourist areas.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have examined the economic and political determinants of decisions taken by 
local governments regarding the amount of new land to be assigned for development. The results 
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 show that urban expansion is influenced by a variety of factors. First, we find, for example, that 
the communities that have expanded most tend to be richer and, moreover, to have enjoyed 
lower growth in the past. Thus, it would seem that, on the one hand, growth is fuelled by rising 
demand even at the local level, while on the other, that fast growth rates do indeed create some 
sort of disamenity to existing residents. Second, we have also identified a link between urban 
expansion and local public finance. However, Spanish municipalities do not appear to be entirely 
rational when taking these effects into account, since they do not consider the long-run net fiscal 
impact of new residents, but tend to focus only on short-run benefits. The evidence suggests that 
Spanish municipalities use urban expansion as a Revenue-machine, as some commentators have 
recently pointed out. Third, politics also seem to have an impact on the decision as to whether to 
put more land on the market. Our findings show that the decision is influenced by the interests of 
different client groups: more land is assigned for development in municipalities in which there 
are more renters and (in particular) more potential new house buyers, and where the local 
government is controlled by rightwing parties (that typically cater more to the interests of land 
developers). The quality of local democracy tends to induce local politicians to cater to more 
general interests: we find that a higher turnout and stiffer local competition help restrain urban 
expansion. Our results are valid for a wide sample of Spanish municipalities, but also for three 
subsamples of urban, non-urban and tourist municipalities. However, both the Revenue-machine 
and the political effects are more pronounced in tourist municipalities than elsewhere. This is as 
expected, since most recent local corruption scandals have occurred in tourist areas. Fourth, we 
also found evidence that open space benefits have a bearing on the decision to put more land on 
the market: communities with more land under their jurisdiction allow more development to 
occur and communities with more valuable land allow less development. Although this last point 
requires a more thorough analysis, it does seem to suggest that local governments are not so 
prone to overgraze the commons as expected. 
 
Thus the picture that emerges from our analysis confirms some of the illnesses that have been 
attributed to Spanish local land-use regulations (namely, the short-sighted view adopted in local 
public finances, a bias favoring developers), although it does not fully confirm other problems 
(for example, overgrazing the commons). Pending more research, the immediate remedies 
should seek to target the specific illness that has been identified. Thus, where the problem is one 
that is related to a short-sighted fiscal policy and special interest politics, greater transparency (in 
terms of both budgets and the adoption of land-use regulations) should be prescribed, as has 
been done by a recent report (Fundación Alternativas, 2007).  
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 Table A.1. Variable definitions and data sources  
 Definition Data sources
Δdevelopable-land-area Growth rate of built-up + vacant land area in 1999-2003 
developable-land-area Built-up + vacant land area in 1999 
Centro de Gestión 
Catastral, Ministry of 
Economics and Finance 
income Per capita  income in 1999 
tourist resort Dummy = 1 if tourist index > 300; Tourist index computed 
with data on the local business tax paid by the tourist sector in 
1999 
 
Anuario Económico de 
España, La Caixa 
coast Dummy = 1 for coastal municipalities 
distance-to-coast Km to the coast 
central city Dummy = 1 if population  > 100,000  (principal) or between 
50,000 and 100,000 (secondary) 
suburb Dummy = 1 if municipality is less than 30 km from main urban 
center or less than 15 km from secondary center 
distance-to-central-city Km to urban center × suburb dummy 
lagged pop. growth Resident population growth rate in 1995-1999 
 
 
 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
lagged housing growth Growth rate in the number of  urban units 1995-1999 Centro de Gestión 
Catastral 
density Resident population / Km2 of build up  area in 1999 National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) and 
Centro de Gestión 
Catastral 
population Resident population in 1999 National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
net-fiscal-impact (Average Spanish property tax rate in 1999 × average assessed 
value of new homes in 1995-1999)  +  (population weight  in 
unconditional grant formula in 1999)  -  (per capita expenditure 
needs in 1999 + increase in per capita costs according to 
estimated cost-population profile × population size in 1999) 
Centro de Gestión 
Catastral  (property tax) 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé 
(2006): per capita 
expenditure needs and 
cost-population profile
Δtransfers-per-resident (Increase in population weight in the unconditional grant 
formula / distance between 1999 population and next 
population threshold)  × 1999 resident population 
 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
debt Interest payments outlays (cap. 3 of the budget) + Capital 
repayment outlays (cap. 9)/ Current revenues, in 1999 
surplus Current revenues – Impact fees – Current spending, in 1999 
 
Ministry of Economics 
and Finance 
% renters %  of buildings  rented, in 2001 
%  residents-25to40 % of residents between 15 and 40 years old, 2001 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE  
center-mayor Main party on left (PSOE) or main right regionalist parties 
(e.g., PNB, CiU) are single parties or  coalition leaders, 1999 
l tiright-mayor Main party on right (PP) or some right regionalist parties who 
are its natural partners (e.g., UV, UPN, CC) are single parties 
or leaders of a coalition, 1999 elections 
local-party-mayor The mayor of a single party or the leader of a coalition is a 
candidate from a local party, 1999 elections 
coalition Local government with more than one party, 1999 elections 
%  electoral- turnout Valid votes cast as %  of voting population, 1999 elections 
% vote-margin Abs. value of the difference between 50% and the % of votes 
obtained by the party/parties in the government in the 1999  
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Interior and 
Ministry of Public 
Administrations 
total-land-area Total land area under  the jurisdiction of a municipality National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
%  forest-land % of municipal land area occupied by forests  
% other-non-
agricultural-land 
% of municipal land not occupied by forests nor by agricultural 
or artificial land 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE), 
Agricultural Census 
 
%  old-houses %  of buildings built before 1950, in 2001 
%  empty-houses %  of buildings not occupied, in 2001 
National Institute of 
Statistics (INE), Census 
of Buildings  
%  unemployed % of population 16 to 65 years unemployed, in 2001 National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
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